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Individuals faced by a tournament can oftentimes not only choose their effort level, but 
also the risk level of their strategy. There are some theoretical contributions on risk 
taking in tournaments, which mainly point out disadvantages with respect to exerted 
effort. Empirical evidence is rare. In this paper we analyze risk taking behavior of 
professional soccer coaches. We find that risk taking concerning the kind of observed 
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1.   Introduction 
Arranging a rank-order tournament between several agents, a principal usually wants to 
achieve two aims: First, she wants to induce incentives for the agents to work hard, 
second, she wants to identify the most able agent. The theoretical literature on risk 
taking in tournaments (Hvide 2002, Hvide & Kristiansen 2003, Yumoto 2003, Kräkel & 
Sliwka 2004) indicates that the achievement of these aims is extremely jeopardized 
when the agents are able to choose strategies of different risk. The agents may prefer to 
play high risk strategies and, as a direct consequence, to choose inefficiently low efforts. 
Moreover, the tournament’s outcome would then be mainly influenced by luck or 
random components and, hence, would not entail much new information about the 
agents’ abilities. 
 
Summarizing, risk taking behavior in tournaments might have extremely negative 
consequences for the principal. It is therefore of great interest to explore how important 
risk taking is in practice. In this paper, we empirically address two questions. Do agents 
participating in rank-order tournaments make use of very risky strategies? If so, does 
risk taking pay off for the agents, that is, are risk taking agents more successful than non 
risk taking ones?  
 
We examine data of German Major League Soccer.
1 The advantage of using soccer data 
is that soccer exactly represents the structure of a tournament, where agents may choose 
strategies of different risk. In our setting, the agents are the teams’ coaches. They are in 
competition against each other, since coaches of rather unsuccessful teams are likely to 
get fired and to realize significant reductions in income. Further, risk taking can be 
measured very easily by considering the team formations. A very offensive formation is 
definitely riskier than a very defensive one. However, it should be stressed that in 
soccer, at least during the matches, the coaches’ efforts are of little importance, since 
the players are the ones exerting effort. Hence, in soccer, the effort reducing effect of 
risk taking – stressed by the theoretical literature – should not be relevant. Negative 
                                                 
1 Other papers, which examine soccer data, include e.g. Reilly & Witt (1995), Haugen & Hervik (2002) 
and Koning (2003). Incentive effects of sports tournaments have been analyzed by Ehrenberg & 
Bognanno (1990, Golf), Becker & Huselid (1992, stock car races) as well as Garicano & Palacios-Huerta 
(2001, soccer).   3
effects of risk taking in soccer are therefore not obvious. The soccer data allows us to 
evaluate the impact of risk taking on the tournament’s outcome. Particularly, we can 
explore, whether risk taking or non risk taking agents are more successful. 
 
There exist only a few related papers that empirically analyze risk taking in 
tournaments. Chevalier & Ellison (1997) show that fund managers raise their portfolio 
riskiness, when their funds performance is below the average. By catching up with the 
average, fund managers would realize a big increase in the inflow of investment. On the 
other hand, further falling behind the average would only entail small reductions in 
investments in the fund. Lee (2004) finds similar results investigating the World Poker 
Tour. Professional Poker players show a riskier behavior, when the chance of winning a 
lot of money comes along with little risks of losing money. 
 
First, this paper supports the findings of Chevalier & Ellison and Lee. The coach of a 
team leading in a match is likely to switch to a less risky strategy, whereas the coach of 
the opponent team reacts in an opposite way, that is, he chooses a riskier team 
formation. Most interestingly, we show that switching to a strategy of higher risk is less 
successful than maintaining the initial one. We, therefore, find evidence that risk taking 
does not only affect the dispersion of an outcome, but also its expectancy. This aspect is 
neglected in the previous empirical and theoretical literature. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: We present two hypotheses in section 2. A 
description of our data is placed in section 3. In section 4, we present our main results. 
Concluding remarks are offered in section 5.    
 
2. Hypotheses 
In German Major League Soccer (as in most other soccer leagues), a team winning a 
match receives three points, while a losing team receives no point. In case of a tie, both 
teams receive one point. The teams are ranked according to the overall points they have 
received. If some teams have same overall points, these teams are ranked according to 
the difference in goals scored and goals suffered. Hence, a coach mainly cares for points   4
received by his team. Figure 1 therefore describes the incentive structure during a single 
match for a certain team.  
 
On the x-axis, we measure the difference in goals scored by the considered team and its 
opponent. If the team is one goal down, it will not lose any points by suffering further 
goals. On the other hand, the team will receive additional points by scoring goals itself. 
For instance, a team will get two more points (3 instead of 1), if it breaks a tie. The 
coach should then be likely to switch to a riskier strategy. If the considered team leads 
by one goal, the argumentation is contrary and the coach should be likely to switch to a 
less risky strategy. This argumentation is summarized in hypothesis 1. 
 
Hypothesis 1. The coach of a team leading (being behind) during a match should 
switch to a less risky (riskier) strategy. 
 
 
Figure 1: Incentive structure of a soccer match 
 
 
In sports like soccer, people often talk about so-called “six-point-matches”. These are 
matches between “direct rivals”, that is, matches, where teams having almost the same 
ranking compete. If a team wins such a match, it will not only receive 3 points, but also 
guarantee that its direct rival gets no point. The incentive structure in a six-point-match 
is described by figure 2. Starting from a tie, a team competing in a six-point-match has 
more to lose than a team competing in an ordinary three-point-match. The incentive 
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structure in the decisive area is linear instead of convex as in an ordinary match. One 
could therefore guess that coaches choose less risky starting formations in six-point-
matches. This is hypothesis 2. 
 
Hypothesis 2. In a match with teams being similar ranked, the coaches should 
choose less risky starting formations than in ordinary matches.    
 
 
Figure 2: Incentive structure of a soccer match against direct rival 
 
 
3.  Data and Variables 
Our data contains all 306 matches of season 2003/2004 of German Major League 
Soccer. The league consists of 18 teams, which are faced in a double round robin 
tournament. A soccer team consists of 11 players. In general, we distinguish between 
four tactical positions: goalkeeper, defender, midfielder and forward. The players are 
specialized in one of these positions. Inevitably, one and only one goalkeeper is one of 
the 11 players. The coaches can decide on the number of players of the other tactical 
positions. Up to three substitutions per team are allowed during a match. The coaches 
can undertake risk neutral substitutions (same tactical position), risk taking substitutions 
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(defender or midfielder replaced by forward, defender replaced by midfielder) and risk 
reducing substitutions (midfielder or forward replaced by defender, forward replaced by 
midfielder). A risk taking substitution usually increases the possibility to score a goal in 
a certain period, but also increases the probability to suffer one. We examine both the 
starting formations of the teams and the kind of substitutions. Besides, we know the 
scores at the moment of each substitution, the final score and the ranking of the team 
before the match. The data is available in the internet at www.kicker.de. Players are 
matched to tactical positions by Kicker – the main German soccer magazine – as well. 
 
Examining 306 matches with two teams, we have got 612 observations. On average the 
teams consists of 3.5 defenders and 2.4 forwards at the beginning of a match. We 
observe 1682 substitutions during the whole season, whereby 24 percent can be defined 
as risk taking substitutions and 21 percent as risk reducing ones.  
 
4. Results 
First, we want to examine the effect of the current score on risk taking and risk 
reduction (hypothesis 1). We, therefore regress the goal difference – defined as the 
number of goals scored by the team minus goals scored by the opponent – on risk taking 
and risk reducing substitutions. Binary probit regressions provide evidence in support of 
hypothesis 1 (see Table 1). Indeed, the probability of risk taking (risk reducing) 
substitutions is decreasing (increasing) in the differences of goals. Coaches replace a 
more defensive player by a more offensive one, when their teams are behind. On the 
contrary, coaches want to reduce the probability of suffering a goal, when their teams 
are staying ahead.  
 
The kind of substitution may also be affected by the ex ante probability to win the 
match. Usually it is a considerable advantage to play at home.
2 Additionally, teams at 
the top of the ranking are favorites against teams with weaker performance in the 
previous matches. Probably, favorites rather than underdogs will be up to risk taking 
substitutions. Hence, we expect a positive (negative) effect of a home match and a 
negative (positive) effect of the difference in the ranking – defined as the ranking of the 
                                                 
2 During the observation period there have been 160 home, but only 74 away victories.   7
club minus the ranking of the opponent – on risk taking (risk reducing) behavior of the 
coaches. In tendency, the results confirm these considerations. 
 
Table 1: Binary probit regressions on risk taking behavior 


















Team dummies (18)  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R²
  0.080 0.050 
Number of observations  1682  1682 




Second, we hypothesized a more defensive starting formation in matches against direct 
rivals in the overall ranking (hypothesis 2) because of the different incentive structure. 
In order to examine this issue, we use the number of defenders and forwards in the 
starting formations as dependent variables in ordered probit regressions. The character 
of a match against a direct rival is measured with the absolute difference in the ranking, 
so that this variable has low values for matches against rivals. Hence, we expect a 
negative (positive) effect on the number of defenders (forwards). Tactical formations 
may also depend on the place of the match (home versus away match). Hypothesis 2 
cannot be confirmed. The effects of the absolute difference in the ranking are not 
significant and the sign with respect to the number of forwards is even negative instead 
of positive (see Table 2). Obviously, the coaches do only concentrate on their own team 
and do not take into account the relative ranking to their opponent. Coaches choose to 
begin home matches with significant more forwards, though. 
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Table 2: Ordered probit regressions on number of defenders and forwards in 
starting formation 
  # Defenders  # Forwards 









Team dummies (18)  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R²
  0.191 0.260 
Number of observations  612  612 
Note: Absolute t-values in parentheses-. *** indicate significance at the 0.01 level.  
 
 
At last, we want to evaluate the success of risk taking behavior in soccer matches. If a 
coach chooses a risk taking substitution – probably if his team is behind – he aims an 
advancement of the score and therefore, an advancement of received points. We 
measure success of a team in a particular match as the score advancement from the 
moment of the first substitution to the final whistle. It is possible that this measure is 
positive, but nevertheless a team looses a match. Therefore, we make use of an 
additional second measure: the advancement of received points, which is defined as the 
difference of actual points after a match minus hypothetical points due to the score at 
the moment of the first substitution. As mentioned above, a coach can undertake up to 
three substitutions during a match. We generate an overall measure of the coaches risk 
taking based on all observable substitutions. Forwards get the value 2, midfielder the 
value 1 and defender the value 0. We calculate the difference of the values of the new 
and the replaced player for each substitution. Then, the degree of risk taking is defined 
as the sum of these differences of all substitutions for a certain team and match. Hence, 
a high value determines a high level of risk taking and negative values coincide with 
risk reducing behavior. The distribution of the variables score advancement,  point 
advancement and degree of risk taking are given in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Frequencies of score advancement, point advancement, and risk taking 
behavior 
  Score advancement  Point advancement Degree of risk taking 
-4  1 0.002     5  0.008 
-3  9 0.015  2  0.003  18 0.029 
-2  36 0.059  22  0.036 48  0.078 
-1  133 0.217 61 0.100 142  0.232 
0  249 0.407  418  0.683 182  0.297 
+1  131 0.214 29 0.047 126  0.206 
+2  40 0.065  70  0.114 59  0.096 
+3  8 0.013  10  0.016  28 0.046 
+4  4 0.007     4  0.007 
+5  1 0.002        
Σ  612 1  612  1 612  1 
 
 
The variables score advancement and point advancement have an ordinal scale. 
Evaluating the effect of risk taking behavior on success, we, therefore, use ordered 
probit regressions again. Home match and difference in ranking before the match again 
act as control variables. Table 4 reveals that risk taking behavior lead to a worsening of 
the score. Hence, the increase in the probability to suffer a goal outweighs the increased 
possibility to score an additional goal. As described in section 2, a team being behind 
has little to loose except for a worse goal difference, but can achieve a point 
advancement next to the score advancement. However, the degree of risk taking 
behavior does not lead to a point advancement, either. On the contrary, point 
advancement is also negatively associated with the degree of risk taking. Hence, 
avoiding offensive substitutions result in higher probabilities to catch up a handicap or 
break a tie. Probably, the coaches overestimate the advantages of risk taking on average. 
In other words, they underestimate the chances of score and point advancements with 
their chosen tactical starting formation. Obviously, the disadvantages of risk taking 
dominate. Therefore, not only the distribution of possible outcomes is dispersed by risk 
taking in professional soccer, but also the expectancy is affected negatively. 
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Table 4: Ordered probit regressions on score and point advancement 
  Score advancement  Point advancement 
Degree of risk taking













Team dummies (18)  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R²
  0.048 0.024 
Number of observations  612  612 
Note: Absolute t-values in parentheses-. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 




In this paper, we empirically analyzed the relevance of risk taking in tournaments. 
Using data from German Major League Soccer, we found that risk taking matters. 
Coaches of teams leading during a match switch to less risky strategies, while the 
opposite is true for coaches of teams being behind. Most interestingly, we demonstrated 
that switching to a riskier strategy for a coach is worse than maintaining the initial 
strategy in that it leads to a lower expected score and point advancement. This is quite 
surprising. One should expect that a team being one or more goals down should be more 
likely to achieve a point advancement, when it switches to riskier strategy. Obviously, 
an increase in risk not only enhances the variance of the outcome distribution, but also 
decreases its mean.  
 
What do these results entail for the optimal organization of firms? Theoretical literature 
states that firms should not use tournaments in settings, where agents’ efforts are a 
crucial issue and agents are able to play high-risk strategies. However, if agents´ efforts 
are less important, the decision of a firm, whether or not to arrange tournaments, should 
depend on the firm’s objective function. We examined that the expectancy of the 
outcome is affected by risk taking as well. Firms that maximize aggregate performance   11
might therefore be better off with avoiding tournaments and implementing different 
incentive schemes. On the contrary, in environments where the best performance is to 
be maximized – such as perhaps in R&D departments, where only a new invention 









Becker, B. E., Huselid, M. A., 1992. The Incentive Effects of Tournament 
Compensation Systems. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37, 336-350. 
Chevalier, J.A., Ellison, G.D., 1997. Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to 
Incentives. Journal of Political Economy, 105, 1167-1200. 
Ehrenberg, R. G., Bognanno, M. L., 1990. Do Tournaments have Incentive Effects?. 
Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1307-1324. 
Haugen, K. K., Hervik, A., 2002. Estimating the Value of the Premier League or the 
Most Profitable Investment Project. Applied Economics Letters, 9, 117-120. 
Hvide, H.K., 2002. Tournament Rewards and Risk Taking. Journal of Labor 
Economics, 20, 877-898. 
Hvide, H.K., Kristiansen, E.G., 2003. Note: Risk Taking in Selection Contests. Games 
and Economic Behavior, 42, 172-179. 
Koning, R. H., 2003. An Econometric Evaluation of the Effect of Firing a Coach on 
Team Performance. Applied Economics, 35, 555-564. 
Kräkel, M., Sliwka, D., 2004. Risk Taking in Asymmetric Tournaments. German 
Economic Review, 5, 103-116. 
Lee, J., 2004. Prize and Risk-Taking Strategy in Tournaments: Evidence from 
Professional Poker Players. IZA Discussion Paper No. 1345. 
Reilly, B., Witt, R., 1995. English League Transfer Prices: Is there a Racial 
Dimension?. Applied Economics Letters, 2, 220-222. 
Yumoto, Y., 2003. Risk Taking in Promotion Tournaments. Mimeo, Nanzan. 